Multinational cash management and conglomerate discounts in the euro zone by Eije, Henk von & Westerman, Wim
  
 University of Groningen
Multinational cash management and conglomerate discounts in the euro zone
Eije, Henk von; Westerman, Wim
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2001
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Eije, H. V., & Westerman, W. (2001). Multinational cash management and conglomerate discounts in the
euro zone. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
1Multinational Cash Management and Conglomerate
Discounts in the Euro Zone
Henk von Eije and Wim Westerman 1
SOM-theme A Primary processes within firms
SOM-theme E Financial markets and institutions
Also downloadable in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/
                                                                
1 The authors work at the Faculty of Management and Organisation of the University of
Groningen, The Netherlands. The authors are indebted to suggestions and comments of Marc
Padberg, Jacco Keijzer, Henk Ritsema, Bob Scapens and anonymous referees. Of course the
usual disclaimer remains.
2Abstract
We discuss the impact of liberalisation, deregulation and the introduction of a single
currency on cash management within multinationals in the euro zone. The
developments in the euro zone reduce financial market imperfections in transferring
cash and diminish the need for separate local cash holdings. This facilitates the
centralisation of cash management and headquarters' financial control. Increased
financial power of multinational headquarters, moreover, offers opportunities for
disintermediation. By exploiting these options multinationals in the euro zone can
start to reap additional benefits of internal financing and conglomerate discounts of
euro zone multinationals may diminish.
31. Introduction
Formerly, European financial markets were characterised by the existence of market
imperfections. This was especially the case for the short-term financial markets. Since
the revival of the European Common Market, as initiated by the White Paper of 1985 2, a
number of these imperfections have gradually disappeared. This process is fuelled once
more by the introduction of the euro in the period 1999-2002. Most of the literature on
these changes focuses on the consequences for macro-economic and monetary policy
and development, but much less attention is given to the impact of these changes for
non-financial euro zone 3 multinationals.
We discuss in this paper the consequences of the changing financial market
circumstances for these companies. In particular we will concentrate on the
consequences for cash management within multinational euro zone firms 4.
                                                                
2 Completing the Internal Market, White paper from the Commission to the European Council,
1985.
3 The euro zone is often considered to be the group of 12 countries within the European
Community that introduces the euro as a single currency. These are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. Moreover, smaller countries like Andorra, Monaco and Vatican City will also
be using the euro and we include them in the euro zone. However, other countries or
regions like Serbia and Kosovo that will switch from German marks to euros are not
considered by us to be part of the euro zone.
4 We mainly address here multinationals that operate completely within the euro zone, but
other multinationals may also be affected, like for example US based multinationals with
subsidiaries within the euro zone.
4Cash management is a topic that is addressed mainly by practitioners and by
scholars who study cash management practices or conduct financial modelling, but it
can also be approached from a theoretical perspective. In this respect two distinct
approaches can be distinguished. Firstly, cash management can be considered as a
stand-alone topic within the management of short-term assets and the question is
addressed how much cash is needed in comparison to other liquid assets. It is the
main approach in textbooks on short-term financial management (e.g. Hill and
Sartoris, 1995; Maness and Zietlow, 1998). Secondly, cash management theories can
start with the perfect markets assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961). The theory then suggests that companies
need no cash at all unless market imperfections urge companies to hold it (Van
Horne, 2002). Transaction costs involved in frequently attracting additional debt
and/or equity -e.g. if cash funds are needed to pay suppliers or employees- are high.
Therefore it may be worthwhile to hold cash funds, even if these funds do not
generate any return. Also bankruptcy costs come to the fore as a reason for cash
holdings. If creditors are not paid in time, they may force the company into
bankruptcy and the shareholders and managers try to avoid the concomitant costs.
In this paper we follow the latter approach. The developments within the euro
zone have reduced market imperfections and we evaluate how these have affected
cash management in multinationals. We add the context of a multinational, a firm that
has operating subsidiaries in at least four countries, because major developments in
5the financial markets of the euro zone have their impact across countries and do not
only affect local companies. Moreover, multinationals are more complex than single-
country companies and it is usual to find a corporate headquarter and local
subsidiaries. Managers of local subsidiaries can be considered to be the agents of the
board members at the multinational headquarter, while the board members in their
turn are agents of the shareholders. In particular the agency relationships between
local and headquarter managers is important here because the control of cash is a
determinant in exercising power. Managers of local subsidiaries might like to keep as
much cash as possible within their realm. According to Jensen (1986), free cash
(flows) may introduce agency costs. Moreover, the investment in cash, bank accounts
and short term paper does not give high returns. For these reasons the value of the
multinational may decline if unnecessary amounts of cash are left at the local level. In
that case the internal financial market within the multinational is inadequate and the
company may show a "conglomerate discount" when compared to a comparable set
of stand-alone companies.
In section 2 we present the relevant theory. In section 3 we address the
impact of liberalisation and deregulation on the financial choices available to
multinationals. In section 4 we analyse the impact of the introduction of a single
currency. In section 5 we present the concomitant developments of multinational cash
management systems. In section 6 we discuss the implications of these changes for
6headquarters' control and conglomerate discounts. Finally, section 7 provides the
conclusions.
2. Conglomerate benefits or discounts
Multinationals being a sub-sample of conglomerates, the literature thereon is relevant
here. Financial literature has been involved with the value of conglomerates for a
long time. While diversification theory based on Markowitz (1952) suggested that a
conglomerate could benefit from the reduction of total risk, further developments in
risk theory (Sharpe, 1964) stressed that shareholders could diversify their portfolio
themselves and that they did not need any help from the companies in which they
invest. The formation of a conglomerate would not add value to the shareholders. For
that reason finance theory has been searching for other benefits of amalgamated
firms, and also for the disadvantages, because empirical evidence has shown that in
general a take-over adds value only to the shareholders of the target firm.
One major study of the Beatrice company (Baker, 1992) revealed that the
value of conglomerates may have changed over time. During the first part of the last
century mergers benefited the participating companies because the conglomerate
headquarter could add value. In particular financial, juridical, managerial knowledge
and financial resources were scarce and a conglomerate could more easily apply these
7scarce and valuable resources than single companies. However, business schools have
made business knowledge available for many people and now, because that
knowledge is less scarce, single companies can afford these knowledge resources too.
Moreover, the development of junk bonds has made it possible for knowledgeable
outsiders to break up conglomerates if the performance of the conglomerate is
inadequate. For these reasons single companies nowadays have opportunities which
equal those of conglomerates. One can add that the knowledge resources of
subsidiaries of a conglomerate may also have increased and that this has reduced the
relative power of conglomerate headquarters.
If single companies or divisions are on an equal footing with conglomerates,
one might ask why conglomerates still exist. A variety of reasons may come to the
fore (Funk, 1999), but a major suggestion is that conglomerate financing and the
internal reallocation of money across subsidiaries may have benefits. Stein (1997), for
example, suggests that a corporate headquarter may be better than an outside bank in
finding winning investment opportunities and that, in this sense, a conglomerate
headquarter can add value to a diversified firm. Scharfstein (1998), however, finds
evidence that divisions in high potential industries tend to invest less than their stand
alone industry peers, while the reverse is true for the low potential divisions. Also
Shin and Stulz (1996) find that in general the conglomerate fails to allocate more
funds to divisions in industries with better investment opportunities. Furthermore,
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) show that diversified firms tend to trade at a
8discount in comparison to comparable firms and that the discount is positively related
to the extent of investment misallocation and the diversity of the investment
opportunities across divisions. In particular when headquarter has limited power,
funds may be allocated to the "wrong" investment projects. This is corroborated by
Mudambi (1999), who found that when a headquarter grants more power to
subsidiaries, the functioning of the internal capital market will be hampered.
Khanna and Tice  (2001), however, suggest that conglomerate discounts are
mainly found within samples of unrelated diversifications. Conglomerates with
unrelated subsidiaries have more problems with internal financing, than
conglomerates where all subsidiaries are active in the same line of business. In the
latter case there are less possibilities for managers of subsidiaries to misinform
corporate headquarters on preferred local investment opportunities. Moreover,
managers may be transferred more easily from one subsidiary to another and they
may therefore be less inclined to favour their subsidiary with irrational investments.
Finally, Burch, Nanda and Narayanan (2000) suggest that conglomerate discounts are
caused by the fact that mainly firms of lower quality prefer to participate in
conglomerates.
Thus theory and empirical research on conglomerates, in general, suggest that
lower quality companies in unrelated conglomerates with weak headquarters may be
able to obtain financing for poor investments. In this paper we will suggest that the
developments in the euro zone strengthen (and have strengthened) the power of
9conglomerate headquarters and therefore may help (and have helped) to reduce the
impact of conglomerate discounts.
3. Liberalisation, deregulation and financial transactions
In this section we discuss the impact on the choices available to multinationals of
liberalisation and deregulation within the euro zone. Developments outside the euro
zone that affected the developments within the euro zone (e.g. those within the
European Union in general) will also be discussed.
Previously, transfers of company cash flows in Europe were obstructed by
taxes on dividends, royalties and interest payments and by high transfer tariffs levied
by banks. In 1990 two directives on dividend transfers 5 and on royalties and interest
payments 6 were issued. The first directive stated that withholding taxes on
intracompany dividends throughout the EU had to be abolished. It became effective
in 1992 (only Germany, Portugal and Greece were allowed to maintain withholding
taxes temporarily). The other directive forbids intracompany withholding taxes on
                                                                
5 Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in
the case of parent companies and subsidiaries in different Member States, OJ EC L225/6 of
20 August 1990; see also Corrigendum to Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 (OJ EC
L23/35 of 29 January 1991).
6 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and
royalty payments made between parent companies and subsidiaries in different Member
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royalties, operational lease and interest payments in the European Union. Currently,
further harmonisation of these withholding taxes throughout the EU is strived for,
while corporate tax rates are already converging in the EU (Austin, 1999).
Because banking tariffs for intra-EU cash flow transfers were judged to be
high throughout the EU (transactions often being charged twice; at both the payer and
the receiver levels), the European Commission enforced legislation here as well 7. As
a result, European banking tariffs were reduced severely, but only gradually.
While financial liberalisation can be said to refer to the lifting of restrictions
on international capital markets, financial deregulation refers to the same activity in
domestic markets 8. Previously, the domestic regulations were intended to prevent
concentrations and distortions in the local financial systems. These regulatory
frameworks, however, were both ineffective and inefficient (Friedman and Friedman,
1980). Later deregula tion was aimed at free trade in all financial products and
services, and at giving financial institutions a free choice on the location of their
affiliates. Such deregulation has been facilitated by changing government attitudes
and enforced by a number of Directives of the European Union 9.
                                                                                                                                                                         
States - COM (90) 571, OJ EC C53/26 of 28 February 1991.
7 Council directive 97/5/EC on cross border credit transfers, OJ EC L43 of 14 February,
1997.
8 Although the trend in Europe is directed towards deregulation, in some cases regulations
(e.g. concerning liquidity and solvency of financial institutions) have become stricter.
9 Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the co-ordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780, OJ EC L386/1 of 30 December 1989;
Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on the own funds of credit institutions, OJ EC
11
Although the EU directives concerning the deregulation of financial markets
and institutions were only implemented in the nineties, the changes are already
remarkable. A bank that is authorised in one European country can establish affiliates
in the other member states ("Single Banking License"). This enables previously
foreign banks to become domestic banks and quite some large banks have already
established presence throughout most European countries. In view of the ruling of the
Court of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon case 10, a (financial) product authorised in one
EU member state may also be marketed in all other member states. Issuance of new
financial instruments, such as interest and currency futures, options and swaps, and
also commercial paper, medium term notes and bullet loans, are now allowed in most
of the European countries and limitations on debit and credit interest levels have been
removed throughout Europe.
It will be clear that these developments offer multinationals the option of
concentrating their financing. With respect to the transfer of funds from one country
to another, market imperfections based on taxes, tariffs and other regulations have
been reduced. Moreover, the costs of using the banking system have diminished:
bank charges have dropped and transfers can be taken care of by just one bank that
operates in many countries. Finally, the variety of financial products has also
increased. Previously, a perceived need to use additional or new financial instruments
                                                                                                                                                                         
L124/16 of 5 May 1989; Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio
for credit institutions, OJ EC L386/14 of 30 December 1989.
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forced European multinationals to finance themselves within the countries where
these instruments were available. Now, all financing instruments are allowed in all
the countries, and financial innovations in one country can be used in another country
as well.
4. A single currency and market imperfections
The European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979 to mitigate the
fluctuations between the European currencies. France and Germany were among the
founders of the EMS. Several countries have joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the EMS since, though a few of them dropped out again later. In 1988 the
EU-countries agreed on a new directive 11 to abolish mutual exchange controls, which
was effective for most countries in 1993. Only Portugal and Greece were allowed to
postpone the implementation of this directive to the full extent until 1995. The
controls that were lifted were quite substantial. Belgium and Luxembourg (both using
the Belgian Franc), for instance, removed their two-way classification system of
transactions, which had formerly led to two currency rates for the franc. In Italy
                                                                                                                                                                         
10 Case 120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (1979) ECR 649.
11 Council Directive 88/361 of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, OJ EC L178/5 of 8 July 1988.
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capital movements were no longer restricted to a maximum amount. In Spain foreign
funding of local firms was now possible, as it also became in Ireland. Spain also lifted
restrictions on foreign currency bank accounts and Ireland removed all restrictions on
currency flows to non-residents.
Until 1992 the EMS currencies maintained relative mutual stability and an
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was thought to be a logical follow-up of the
plans for a Single Market (Gibson, 1996). In this context, the three-stage Delors Plan
was accepted in December 1989. In the first stage all currencies of the European
Union would join the ERM and exchange controls would be removed. In 1992 these
goals were achieved by and large. However, due to for example the German
unification in 1990, the ERM de-stabilised. In September 1992, the British pound and
the Italian lira dropped out of the ERM. Until August 1993, the currencies of the
ERM- countries were allowed to fluctuate within 2.25% (+ or -) around the central
rate. Following, all currencies (except the Dutch guilder vis-à-vis the German mark)
kept 15% (+ or -) around the central rate. Parity changes had to be approved by all
countries, which had the joint responsibility of maintaining stable mutual currency
rates. Nevertheless, only a few countries were able to meet the ERM convergence
criteria with respect to inflation levels, long term interest rates, government deficits,
government debt and currency stability, and consequently many countries then
doubted the feasibility of the EMU. In the second stage, however, monetary policies
of the member states were knitted together, resulting in more convergence. Italy
14
returned to the ERM, while several other countries were joined. In the third stage,
which started in 1999, the parity rates were fixed irreversibly and the euro was estab-
lished as a single inter-bank European currency. It became the symbol of an
integrated European monetary policy within the euro zone and it enables the
transformation from all local currencies into a single currency at the beginning of
2002.
One major consequence of a single currency is that transaction costs for
exchanging currencies are annihilated. The transfer of money from one country to
another thus becomes cheaper. Concentrating cash management in one country in
order to reap the benefits of economies of scale (and financial power) becomes
feasible. Not only are the external costs of exchanging currencies abolished, but so
also are the internal costs originating from the need to perform currency
recalculations and to assemble information on currency prices. Another important
consequence of one single currency is that various types of exchange risk
(transaction, translation and economic risk) diminish for multinationals that operate
within the euro zone. When these risks threaten the solvency of a company, their
abolition reduces bankruptcy costs and so the liquidity needed for coping with
bankruptcy costs diminishes. Therefore, cash balances can become more concentrated
and the total amount of cash needed becomes smaller than it would be with
15
subsidiaries working with separate currencies12. Moreover, headquarters (or at least
concentrated corporate treasuries) will have greater power, as more money is
channelled through them.
5. Centralisation and disintermediation
Typically, the cash management system of a multinational in the euro zone has
traditionally been structured in a simple way. In every country where the company
had substantial operating facilities, the treasury of the affiliate often largely did its
own cash management (Soenen and Aggarwal, 1989; Tse and Westerman, 1997).
This was a rational approach because of the imperfections in the European capital
markets. After liberalisation, deregulation and the introduction of a single currency,
these market imperfections have diminished quite significantly along with the costs of
centralising the finance function.
Centralisation
Centralisation offers various advantages (Kenyon et. al., 1992; Brown, 1997; Miles,
1997).  Firstly, concentrating financing gives economies of scale and negotiating
                                                                
12 Multinationals do not necessarily have less liquid resources than other companies, because
they may need more liquidity for other reasons, like being able to finance take-overs
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power. Secondly, because cash balances, cash flows and risk exposures are decreased,
financing costs are reduced further. Thirdly, leading and lagging of intracompany
cash flows can more easily be traced and controlled. Fourthly, an overall reduction of
treasury personnel throughout the firm may be possible. Fifthly, the services of banks
in transferring cash may be reduced and the concomitant costs can be reduced.
Moreover, the benefits of internal financing may be more easily reaped, as the
concentration of financial know-how helps to improve investment decision making.
There are, however, also various disadvantages. Local managers may lose the
motivation to control cash flows adequately. When the cash management and finance
functions are in the hands of headquarters, the co-ordination between the financial
disciplines and the local knowledge may more easily be frustrated. Moreover, a
centralised cash system requires a highly formalised cash balance control system,
thus raising regulative, administrative and information costs. Finally, internalising
and reorganising the cash balances may disturb relationships of subsidiaries with
local banks.
The disadvantages of centralised European cash management, however,
decline (Van Alphen, 1998). Moreover, netting and pooling of cash positions gain
attractiveness and a trend towards centralised treasuries is already apparent (Peters,
1999). In fact even non-European multinationals have reorganised their European
treasury operations along Pan-European lines. For example, the Goodyear Tyre and
                                                                                                                                                                         
quickly.
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Rubber Company formally incorporated a European treasury centre in Luxembourg.
That treasury now provides access to capital markets, establishes and maintains bank
relationships, manages currency exchange risk, develops intercompany transaction
strategies, negotiates credit terms with banks, evaluates cash utilisation and
establishes guidelines for SBU cash management, among others (Brown, 1997, p.
36). We expect that deregula tion and liberalisation as well as the introduction of the
Euro may have helped to tip the balance in favour of centralisation and may still be
continuing to do so.
Disintermediation
The form a cash management system takes is not only determined by internal
characteristics. It also involves external relationships, in particular with banks and it
is not surprising that European firms consider their relationship with a bank almost as
important as banks’ prices and service quality (Tse and Westerman, 1997).
The external relationships evolve with centralisation over time. First the
banking system is used to collect receivables and to pay accounts. The relationship
with the "house banks" is asymmetrical: the house bank provides a wide array of
products that firms can use. Then the tendency may evolve to centralise cash
management and the multinational will aim at processing efficiently the various
financial transactions of the operational units. This may lead to a substantial decrease
in the number of bank accounts, since little used accounts will be closed. The finance
18
department of a multinational will be starting to act as a purchasing unit and the
relationships with banks will be loosened as "shopping" with other banks grows and
financial knowledge at headquarters is enlarged.
Still later, the cash function within the multinational may develop into a
corporate finance function that acts in balancing conflicting objectives like
minimising tax and interest payments, reducing interest risks and providing liquidity.
Banks with international networks, know-how and information systems skills may
then shift to providing services instead of products to such departments. In fact, some
large financial institutions have picked up the recent trends, by expanding their
services to more countries and by investments in sophisticated information systems to
be used in the operation of European cash management systems.
Finally, the corporate finance function of a multinational may act as an in-
house bank (Hagemann, 1991). Such an in-house bank provides intracompany
products and services by itself, issues short-term financial instruments like
commercial paper, competes with other banks for the business of third-party
customers and has thus become an equal partner for licensed banks. It will be clear
that the aforementioned centralisation trend goes to the detriment of the intermediary
function of banks.
19
6. Headquarters' control and conglomerate discounts
The joint trends of centralising the cash function and of disintermediation will have
their impact on the power of the multinational's headquarter. Centralisation will,
generally, take place at headquarters, and may positively influence the power of
headquarters with respect to cash management. As the headquarters' lack of power in
financing and investing was a major reason for corporate discounts, the centralisation
of cash management may reduce these discounts.
Headquarters' power may further increase with disintermediation. Firstly
because fewer banks are involved and the bank that remains most relevant for the
multinational will have its main ties with headquarters. Secondly, if the cash
management function develops into a corporate finance function also external
financing will be channelled through headquarters and then -again- the financial
power of headquarters will increase. For these reasons, we expect that the
liberalisation, deregulation and introduction of a single currency will improve the
internal financing function and that conglomerate discounts will decrease.
However, not all multinationals will be able to centralise the cash function
directly (Gruiters and Bergen, 1998) and the centralisation of European cash
management still differs between companies (Tse and Westerman, 1997). Moreover,
not all multinationals will be able or willing to develop the cash management function
into a corporate finance function. Finally, even if a corporate finance function is
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managed centrally at the corporate headquarter, it is not necessarily the case that also
decisions on fixed assets will -or should- be centralised. Conglomerate discounts
based on a lack of power of headquarters with respect to internal financing and
investments will thus not vanish within all multinationals. Nevertheless, it is likely
that the developments in the financial markets assist in reducing conglomerate
discounts for some multinationals in the euro zone 13.
7. Conclusions
Liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as the introduction of the
single currency in Europe will reduce transaction and bankruptcy costs for
multinationals. This gives rise to two trends in Europe. Firstly, internal transfers of
cash and the management of residual cash positions will become cheaper and easier.
Therefore, the centralisation of cash management activities gains attractiveness. This
may even result into a full-fledged corporate finance function at headquarters.
Secondly, the centralisation will affect the relationship of multinationals with banks.
It is likely that the number of bank relations will be reduced, as more money is
                                                                
13 Conglomerate discounts cannot solely be responsible for the comparable low price
earnings ratios in most euro zone countries (Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett, 2001), but our
analysis suggests that deregulation, liberalisation and a single currency may increase these
ratios into the direction of those of the United States.
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managed internally within multinationals and that one major bank will provide most
of the cash management services to the treasuries at multinationals' headquarters.
These trends will have an impact on the internal financing function of
multinationals and if cash management is centralised, conglomerate discounts may
diminish. Multinationals in the euro zone may benefit further if they also operate in
countries that will join the European Union or the euro zone in the future. Because
multinationals have different backgrounds and different reasons for empowering
subsidiaries, the corporate discounts will not vanish completely.
Until now, academics have largely focused on cash management models and
on cash management surveys. Our paper is different as we link the cash management
function to mainstream theory of corporate finance. First we suggest that institutional
changes within the euro zone have reduced market imperfections. Then we show that
the reduction of these imperfections could trigger centralisation and
disintermediation. Finally, we suggest that centralisation followed by
disintermediation may improve the internal financing function within multinationals.
This may eventually diminish conglomerate discounts and improve the value of the
multinational.
It is outside of the scope of this paper to answer the empirical question
whether the centralisation of cash management is beneficial to multinationals.
Nevertheless, further empirical research might be interesting. In particular, it would
be interesting to learn whether multinationals that centralise their cash management
22
function do indeed outperform in terms of value the comparable multinationals that
did not. Our analysis not only suggests that centralisation creates value, but that the
concomitant disintermediation adds value too. Researchers could therefore, also try to
measure the amount of disintermediation and study its impact on conglomerate
discounts. Of course, such research may create multicollinearity problems because
disintermediation will be related to centralisation. Moreover, econometric
simultaneity problems may arise: disintermediation is considered to create value, but
at the same time higher valued companies may be better able to avoid banking
products. Despite of these problems, we hope that our qualitative approach may not
only trigger related theoretical but also empirical research.
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